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An International Comparison of 
the Volatility of Strike Behavior 
Samuel Cameron 
This paper develops a synthetic mode! of the strike process 
which suggests the use of volatility as the measure of severity 
rather than levels or régression intercepts 
There is an immense literature on strikes which is generated by 
numerous disciplines-économies, politics, sociology, industrial relations 
etc.; in contrast the meagre literature on international comparisons is 
dominated, so far as analytical work goes, by political scientists.1 
A synthetic model would appear to be required, particularly if we in-
tend to attempt international comparisons. The implications of the model 
are tested by studying the variation in measures of strike activity. This must 
not be taken to imply that the level of strike activity is not important or that 
the variance of measures may not be related to their means. We rank 
measures of variation as this involves fewer data problems and also the 
most important implications of the model are about fluctuation rather than 
levels. 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF STRIKES 
The variations in accuracy, coverage, définitions etc. across countries 
in their strike statistics are such that few sensible statisticians would ever 
contemplate using them to compare levels of disputes, days lost or workers 
involved. Conversely commentators on industrial relations seem almost 
unable to refrain from using them for this purpose. In the United Kingdom 
this stems from the feeling, in the mid-1960's that a strike malaise might be 
a cause or a conséquence of the nation's industrial décline. 
* CAMERON, Samuel, North Staffordshire Polytechnic, Stoke-on-Trent, England. 
i By 'aggregate' we mean at industry or national level; of necessity we are forced to ig-
nore sociological and social psychological théories of strike behaviour, at the level of the in-
dividual plant or firm, in the présent paper. 
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In a satirical attack on such beliefs, Frayn2 complains that the country 
does not hâve enough strikes: 
«Because heaven knows, the country needs more strikes. I've been analysing the 
figures published by the United Nations International Labour Organization showing 
the number of days lost through strikes over the last ten years in eighteen leading in-
dustrial nations. Poor old moribund Britain cornes well down the list- twelfth, in fact 
— with an average of 294 days lost per 1,000 workers per year. In dynamic France 
they averaged 336. In bustling Japan it was 391. In Canada, which according to 
another table published recently has more central heating, more refrigerators, more 
cars, more téléphones, more washing machines, and more télévision sets per 
household than any other country in the world, they did it by losing an average of 
597 days. 
Italy apparently based its Economie Miracle upon a cool 875. And America re-
tained its économie leadership of the world by losing more time through strikes than 
any other nation; every 1,000 workers were out on average for 1,044 days per year.» 
Frayn carries on in this fashion citing figures on cost of living increases 
to show that strikes are positively correlated with prosperity. Although this 
is done in a mocking fashion, the conclusions can be made sensé of using 
the 'accident' models developed by economists,3 i.e. the greater the volume 
of bargaining the greater the likelihood of unintended breakdown, or the 
similar model for the large firm developed by Prais4 in which larger firms 
hâve more breakdowns in negotiation, as Forcheimer5 commentée! the more 
economically developed a nation is the more likely it is to hâve large firms 
and their higher strike propensity will raise the overall figure. 
2 Michael FRAYN, «A Perfect Strike», in R. Blackburn and A. Cockburn (eds.), The 
Incompatibles Trade Union Militancy and the Consensus, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1967; 
quotation from p. 162. 
3 The most récent manifestation of the accident approach is J.T. ADDISON & W.S. 
SIEBER, «Are Strikes Accidentai?», Economie Jouranl 91, 362, 1981, pp. 389-404; although 
not recognised in the above article accident explanations go back a long way amongst 
economists; see e.g. K. MAYHEW, «Economists and Strikes», Oxford Bulletin of Economies 
and Statistics 41, 1, 1979, pp. 1-19; T. LANCASTER & C.R. BARRET, An Econometric 
Model of Strike Frequency, University of Hull Discussion Papers in Economies No 1, 1974; 
J.R. HICKS, 1963, The Theory of Wages, London, Macmillan, second édition, 1963; A.C. 
PIGOU, The Economies of Welfare, Part III Ch. 6, London, Macmillan, 1952; A.C. PIGOU, 
Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace, London, Macmillan, Appendix A, 1905. 
4 S.J. PRAIS, «The Strike-Proneness of Large Plants in Britain», Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Ser. A, 141, 1978, pp. 368-84. 
5 K. FORCHHEIMER, «Some International Aspects of the Strike Movement», 
Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics 10, 1, 1948, pp. 9-25. 
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The Donovan Commission6 and Clegg7 use tables of strikes per 1,000 
workers and days lost per 1,000 workers involved, averaged over 1964-6 for 
15 leading industrialised nations. Donovan does not lay much stress on this 
table; Clegg concludes that it shows Britain to be amongst the countries 
with a high strike frequency (6th.) but having a low place in terms of days 
lost in such countries. It is of interest to note that the top of the Donovan 
table is Ireland (not menioned by Frayn) for days lost whilst the différence 
between France and the U.K. is minimal ( + 1 0 days). 
Whittingham and Towers8 in a topically-inspired pièce (at the time of 
the Industrial Relations Aci) use the average days lost per 1,000 workers in 
the periods 1957-66 and 1960-9 to provide two sets of rankings which place 
Ireland (top of the Donovan table) below the U.S.A. and Italy and places 
the U.K. at 12th. and lOth. respectively. Japan's bustling 391' of the Frayn 
period falls to a meagre 250 in 1960-9 which is below the U.K.'s 268 for the 
same period. The authors (after expressing the customary reluctance) sug-
gest that the move from 12th. to lOth. may represent a downward trend in 
British industrial conflict (see p. 39). (The Towers-Whittingham com-
parisons use 18 countries.) 
Thèse studies are remarkable for the way in which they tend to use 
averaged days lost per 1,000 workers as the indicator of industrial conflict. 
An average is a much more sophisticated device than is commonly recognis-
ed (after ail an average is the mean of a distribution and there is no clear 
reason to neglect other characteristics of the distribution which generated 
the mean) and in the présent case it involves an implicit assumption that it 
somehow represents the 'normal' level. Days lost is used presumably 
because it is regarded as the best reflection of the 'damage' caused by a 
strike. Evidently, the relative conflict proneness of a country can be altered 
by altering the sample period and the other countries in the sample. It is not 
obvious that a normal figure in a country is high relative to others because 
of variations in the effects of conflict and variations in the mechanisms for 
absorbing its costs. 
6 Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, 
1965-8, Command 3263, HMSO 1968. 
7 H. A. CLEGG, The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 3rd. éd., 1976, pp. 315-7. 
8 T.G. WHITTINGHAM & B. TOWERS, «Strikes and the Economy», National 
Westminster Bank Review, November 1971, pp. 33-42. 
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INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF STRIKE BEHAVIOUR 
USING MODELS 
There is a small literature9 in which models of industrial conflict are 
estimated to provide international comparisons. Typically thèse are such 
things as pooled cross-section /time-series régressions or more simply 
separate régressions for each country. In some cases 'strike volume' — days 
lost per 1,000 workers is used as the dépendent variable- the idea of 
volume10 coming from the analogies with length, breadth and height of 
strike duration, size and frequency is used, in others the number of strikes is 
used. 
Thèse studies usually put forward the view that periods in which the 
'économie' variables (e.g. wages and profits) hâve little influence (i.e. the 
model fails- 't ' statistics are poor and coefficients may hâve wrong signs 
etc.) are periods in which the political, cultural, and institutional environ-
ment is not stable and hence cannot be treated as a datum. 
It is found that it is only really the postwar period in which the 
parameters of the économie variables are significant and conform to expec-
tations;11 further Hibbs12 concludes via testing restrictions that the 
parameters on real wages, unemployment and profits are constant across 
diverse Systems of industrial relations. The number of countries used in 
thèse studies is not large (because of the data problems)- the most complète 
is that of Hibbs (1976) which pools time-series for 10 industrialised nations. 
International comparisons using models hâve estimated 'political' 
models for the pre-war period and claimed that thèse out-perform the 
économie models in terms of expected signs achieved and t-statistics. The 
trouble with political models is that it is difficult to find the variables with 
which to estimate them; Snyder uses number of cabinet changes and the 
9 D. SNYDER, «Institutional Setting and Industrial Conflict: Comparative Analyses of 
France, Italy and the United States», American Sociological Review 40, 3, 1975, pp. 259-78; 
D.A. HIBBS, «Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies», American Political 
Science Review 70, 4, 1976, pp. 1033-58; D.A. HIBBS, «On the Political Economy of Long-
Run Trends in Strike Activity», British Journal of Political Science, 1978, 8, pp. 153-77; M. 
SHALEY, «Strikers and the State: A Comment», British Journal of Political Science, 8, 1978, 
pp. 481-94. 
10 The concept of volume is introduced in FORCHHEIMER, op. cit., and is used in 
régressions as the dépendent variable by HIBBS (1976, 1978). 
n See SNYDER, op. cit. on this point; J. CRONIN, Industrial Conflict in Modem Bri-
tain, Croom Helm, London, 1979, argues that économie models only 'work' in Britain for the 
period 1951-67; SNYDER takes the period when such models 'work' to be 1949-70 (U.S.A.), 
1946-66 (France), and Italy (1949-70). 
12 HIBBS, 1976, p. 1050. 
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trade union density as his political variables. The former can only be a dum-
my and the latter might be regarded by economists as an économie 
variable;13 in addition we might see density as simultaneous with strikes (or 
lagged strikes) if displays of union strength cause increased membership. 
An interesting feature of régression studies is that they attempt to 'ex-
plain' the incidence of conflict rather than presenting us with levels which 
are regarded as spécifie to the eountry and somehow 'normal'. In view of 
this the most enlightening way to use the models would be to purge the in-
dicator of conflict of as much of its explainable content as possible and treat 
the constant as the unexplainable content of the indicator; the constants 
could then be compared across countries as indicating innate conflict pro-
pensities. In his pooling strategy, Hibbs14essentially does this as he pools his 
observations using eountry -by-country dummies to «pick up the net effects 
of nation-specific, time-invariant, structural-historical factors not captured 
explicitly (causally) in the équations». Unfortunately he sees the dummies as 
merely part of the estimation problem and hence not interesting enough to 
report. 
A SIMPLE MODEL 
We now attempt an elementary synthesis of the three basic approaches 
to strike activity. For the purposes of exposition, we can regard them as 
mutually exclusive so that they can be set out as in Figure 1 below. 
In each ring we list the type of activity that each model studies; the in-
ner ring is the domain of économie models, the second innermost ring is the 
domain of the 'institutionalist' models of industrial relations theory, the 
outer is the domain of 'political' models. 
We begin at the inner circle and work outwards. The most common ap-
proach to strikes by economists has been to regard them as accidentai out-
comes of wage bargaining. In this view, a strike is something which neither 
side really wishes to occur; when one does occur neither side benefits from 
its direct effects. Strikes occur because of imperfect information about 
bargaining strengths and positions; in the absence of such imperfections, 
accident théories imply that a bargain should be struck without a strike. 
There is an influential rival theory, amongst economists,15 which argues that 
13 For a complète critique of the suspect nature of the good results (suspect because of 
the data) in the political model see SHALEY, op. cit., on the HIBBS (1978) model. 
u HIBBS, 1976, p. 1047, fn. 22. 
15 O.C. ASHENFELTER & G.E. JOHNSON, «Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions and 
Industrial Strike Activity», American Economie Review, 59, 1969, pp. 35-49. 
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the union représentative knows the strengths etc. of management and is, in 
fact, in collusion with them in that he has already agreed on a settlement. A 
strike may arise if the représentative calls one to save his face, as il were, by 
bringing down an unacceptably high wage claim over the duration of the 
strike. The strike serves the dual function of satisfying the management 
with a lower wage claim and convincing the workers that the représentative 
is still 'fighting' for them. 
Some implications of the above two approaches enable us to move to 
the discussion of factors pertaining to the second ring. Both models suggest 
that strikes will converge to some 'optimal' level (also length and coverage); 
in the accident model the optimum will be arrived at through weighing the 
marginal costs and benefits to each side of providing an extra unit of infor-
mation. 
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Economie models generally focus on the number of strikes, rather than 
length or worker involvement, with the occurence of a strike being a 
breakdown in the wage bargaining process. It follows from this that strikes 
are most likely at the expiration of contracts; this is a feature which 
economists sometimes claim is responsible for the seasonal variations in 
strike frequency. As différent countries hâve différent bargaining Systems 
there will be variations in the frequency of striking due to variations in 
typical contract length and the frequency with which contracts are broken. 
Within a single country the length of contract or its propensity to 
breakdown is subject to the influence of exogenous macroeconomic shocks; 
e.g. a more unpredictable inflation rate may generate shorter contracts or 
the reneging of existing ones. Countries with bargaining frameworks which 
are flexible will accomodate such shocks whilst those with inflexible, or 
poorly developed frameworks will hâve a high Volatility' of strike frequen-
cy. 
By 'volatility', we mean the degree of fluctuation in strike indicators, 
i.e. that the distribution of an indicator is widely dispersed so that it is ex-
tremely difficult to predict its level in any period. Under flexible 
frameworks, management will make good prédictions of the reactions of 
workers to ail their actions and vice-versa. Hence volatility generated by 
bargaining breakdown will be low16. We would expect volatility from this 
source to be lower in less developed countries where the processes of 
worker-management negotiation are not yet fully articulated17. 
We now consider industrial relations theory relevant to the second 
ring18. Such theory recognises the importance of the futurity of the 
engagements between negotiating parties; this is neglected in économie 
models which treat deals as essentfally concerned with a one-period payoff. 
The major issue on which a model of the Dubin type départs from that 
of economists is power. The following quotation19 illustrâtes this, the model 
16 The argument that employers should be able to predict strikes and hence offset their 
costs is developed in M. FISHER, The Measurement of Labour Disputes and Their Economie 
Effects, Paris, OECD, 1973; this monograph also provides the most detailed information 
available on international strike statistics and their weaknesses. 
n This is similar to the argument of PIGOU (1905), pp. 15-17 except that he adds the 
thesis that periods of tranquility will induce a certain carelessness in negotiators (they lack the 
sensé of costs from a strike due to lack of récent expériences) which will be periodically 
disciplined by the strikes it causes so that minor ripples are caused. 
18 See R. DUBIN, «Industrial Conflict: The Power of Prédiction», Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 18, 1965, pp. 352-63; J. BARBASH, «Price and Power in Collective Bargain-
ing», Journal of Economie Issues, 11, 1977, pp. 847-59. 
19 DUBIN, op. cit., p. 360. 
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«leads to the prédiction that on 'fundamental' issues in collective bargaining the 
amount of conflict in union-management relations is inversely related to the dispari-
ty in power between company and union, the introduction of a 'fundamental' issue 
in the collective bargaining would resuit in much conflict, while the same issue would 
produce little conflict if there was a wide disparity in power between company and 
union. 'Fundamental' issues were defined as 'those not yet incorporated in collective 
bargaining'.» 
The accident model implies that the number of fundamental issues 
would be progressively reduced as stable negotiating frameworks are 
developed. Dubin predicts that, where fundamental issues do occur, domi-
nant unions or dominant workers will lead to a low conflict propensity 
whilst equally balanced oppositions will lead to a high conflict propensity. 
Thèse arguments about the magnitude of the levels of conflict also carry 
over to its volatility (variability); the tussle to dominate in an equally 
balanced situation should lead to volatile conflict levels, its absence to 
stable conflict levels. 
Power is the ability of one side to enforce its wishes on the other 
through the threat of (or through) withdrawal of resources; an interesting il-
lustration that the strike is an exercise of power cornes in one author's 
définition of it20 as the withdrawal by labour of its demand for the services 
of capital. 
Dubin's prédictions seem to be valid only in the case where we can safe-
ly neglect factors germane to the other two levels of analysis. The exercise of 
power will dépend on relevant elasticities of demand in labour and product 
markets. A choice can be made, by unions, over how they will deal with 
fundamental issues; they can bargain directly about them or engage in what 
Walker21 calls 'extra-market opérations'. An example of an extra market 
opération would be action by organized labour to bring about wage or con-
ditions altérations through state intervention; direct bargains with 
employers are clearly market opérations because they take place in terms of 
the supply and demand of the commodity (labour) under considération. 
This considération leads us to the concerns of the political model which 
analyses the issues of the third ring. This model takes the view that... «in-
dustrial conflict is something more than a mère accident in the collective 
20 See R.V. A N D E L S O N , «The Strike in a Laissez-Faire Society: A Libertarian View of 
Labor ' s Ult imate Strategy», American Journal of Economies and Sociology, 30, 2, 1971, pp . 
159-70. 
21 E.R. W A L K E R , «Beyond the Marke t» in K.W. Rothschild (éd.), Power in 
Economies, Penguin, Harmondswor th , 1971. 
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bargaining process. Rather, the strike constitutes one working-class strategy 
— political action is another — in the action out of class conflict in 
capitalist society»22. 
In a political model, power can be exercised through the influence of 
labour or capital rather than through the withdrawal of resources from a 
market. In économie and industrial relations models strikes are treated on a 
micro level through an analysis of their causes whilst in the political model 
they are treated on a macro model as manifestations of conflict. Conflict 
will be reflected in non-strike protests such as industrial sabotage, working 
to rule, and absenteeism above the levels dictated by ill health and injury. 
Thèse methods may be either substitutes or compléments to strike ac-
tivity in expressing discontent or seeking to exercise power. If they are com-
plementary in roughly similar proportions over time within the same coun-
try then prédictions of a model about the influence of conflict can be ade-
quately tested on the level or variability of strike indicators. 
If the methods are substitutes then our data are subject to the influence 
of variations in the économie viability and social acceptability of strike and 
non-strike methods in différent countries. Clearly this would invalidate the 
use of comparisons of means of indicators. However the comparison of 
volatility should not be invalidated unless substitution between strike and 
non-strike methods is taking place within nations over the time period 
studied. 
Leaving aside the issue of the imperfections of strikes as measures of 
conflict, it must be recognised that strikes serve différent functions in dif-
férent political Systems. In some the strike may be a weapon used to procure 
a stronger place for labour within the state. In such cases there is a clear in-
tention to cause harm to the government perhaps through dislacing it. In 
other countries the strike may be used defensively rather than aggressively, 
e.g. public workers might strike as a method of 'notifying'23 their claims to 
the gênerai public; they will hâve no intention of influencing the polity 
rather they are forced to use the strike in the absence of a suitable method of 
arbitrating the national distribution of employment incomes. 
The implication of the political model is that volatility will increase as 
the cohesiveness of labour, management and the organs of government 
déclines. The original formulation of concept of the 'withering away of the 
22 S H A L E V , 1978, p . 481. 
23 The concept of public sector workers using strikes as a 'notification System' in the 
absence of other methods of publicising the justice of their pay claims is developed in S. 
CAMERON, «Strikes and the Third Party», The Month, 15, 10, October 1982. 
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strike' in developed nations was based on the idea that, with the exception 
of the U.S.A.,24 such cohesiveness was rising so that labour could obtain 
improved conditions through législation rather than the costly, haphazard 
and undesirable resort of striking. 
We can now see clearly that Ross and Hartman's thesis was much too 
simple as strikes hâve exploded, rather than witbering away in developed 
nations, being at a drastically higher level, on ail indicators, from 1969 to 
the late 70's than they were in the 50's and 60's. The récent wilting in the 
strike indices is undoubtedly due to the strong upsurge in unemployment 
rates. 
Some prédictions about volatil'ty follow from considering the 
cohesiveness of économie interest groups in the state. In less developed na-
tions, cohesiveness will undoubtedly be poor particularly where in-
dustrialization is taking place. Industrialization will often involve the 
présence of multinational corporations who will be in conflict with workers 
and the elected government unless they are in control of the government in 
which case we expect heightened conflict with workers. Thèse things will 
contribute to increased volatility. 
Within the developed nations most governments hâve sought, in the 
post war period, to institute cohesiveness with the chief method being in-
comes policies. A successful incomes policy would reduce strikes as the 
absence of claims for a higher share of the national product dictated the 
absence of attempts to achieve it. The collapse of a successful incomes 
policy will lead to an upsurge in strikes particularly if the macroeconomic 
reward for consent- the abatement of inflation is not delivered. A proces-
sion of on-off incomes policies will accordingly generate increased strike 
volatility. 
HYPOTHESES 
As we are mostly concerned with hypothèses about volatility it is wise 
to point out why volatility is the indicator used. In terms of the économie 
model, volatility is a measure of risk- if an economy can adapt to levels of 
strikes through forecasting them and taking appropriate action, then levels 
(of strikes, workers involved, days lost) are meaningless as measures of 
damage. The only real damage caused by strikes is through their unex-
pectedness. 
24 See A.M. ROSS, «Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict», Proceedings of the 
12th. Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association, 1959. 
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Comparing averaged means, does not tell us much about the 'highness' 
or 'lowness' of conflict in terms of its causation by the union-management 
distribution of power as (even stable) institutional frameworks will differ 
across ail nations — the figures contain a nation-specific component plus a 
power-caused component. 
A similar argument applies to the political model- i.e. differing nations 
hâve differing political Systems and figures for means contain a component 
due to this as well as due to the rôle of labour within thèse Systems. 
There seems less reason to suppose that variation differs greatly across 
nations than there is to suppose that the nation-specific component of 
means does. 
Ultimately our measure of variation is composed of variation due to ail 
three sets of causes enumerated in the three types of model considered 
above and it is difficult to see how it could be decomposed into thèse 
éléments. We consider now how the three sources will combine to give the 
total variation for différent types of country. 
Three measures are used for volatility, computed as the coefficient of 
variation, being number of strikes, number of workers involved and 
number of working days lost. 
Variation due to 'économie' factors is expected to be less in developed 
than in less developed nations, following the accident theory which would 
also suggest that such variation will be small relative to that caused by the 
other two types of factors. Also we would expect économie variation to be 
greater in the last two sets of coefficients of variation as it is more difficult 
to 'insure' against the length or coverage of a strike than against its oc-
curence25. 
Variation due to 'institutional' factors should be less where a polarisa-
tion of power exists hence union-dominated or management-dominated (in 
terms of labour markets) économies should exhibit less of such variation. 
Variation due to 'political' factors will be less in countries where the 
labour movement has a secure position within a 'corporatist' state, is itself 
unified, and/or has access to a political party with which it is affiliated. 
25 Single country studies by economists hâve usually used strikes in préférence to the 
other two séries probably because it works better as The R2 in a multiple régression will be 
higher with a less variable regressor. For criticism of this approach, see M. SHALEV, «Trade 
Unions and Economie Analysis: The Case of Industrial Conflict», Journal of Labor Research 
1, 1980, pp. 133-73. Table I shows that low volatility countries in terms of disputes invariably 
display higher volatility in the other two measures. 
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There appears to be no clear prédiction possible about the relative 
magnitudes of variation for the three sets of coefficients in the case of the 
last two factors. 
On 'political' grounds, volatility is expected to be higher within less 
developed nations where there is industrialization through multinational 
corporations and within developed nations where there are on-off income 
policies combined with a higher mean and variance of inflation. 
RESULTS 
Table I présents coefficients of variation of the three séries of strike 
behaviour for 62 countries (further détails on data are given in the Appen-
dix) using data for 1968-77. Suitable data, are not available for ail nations-
this is the reason for the blanks in parts of the table. There are two 
statistical problems with thèse results; one is the small sample size, this is 
difficult to overcome as the further back we take the séries the harder it is to 
keep them reasonably comparable (also breaks occur), the other is the 
unreliability of the coefficient of variation (given as C.V.) when the mean is 
close to zéro — this is more serious with the number of disputes than the 
other indicators — to provide a check we give the means of ail the data in 
Table 2. 
The first thing which is immediately apparent is the tendency for ad-
vanced industrial nations to appear at the bottom of the rankings of the 
three C.V's with the striking exception of the Scandinavian countries. The 
bottom fifteen of ail three séries contain the U.S.A., Italy, France, Ireland, 
Belgium, New Zealand, and the U.K. whilst Japan, Canada, Spain and 
Australia only go above the bottom fifteen on one indicator each. 
Switzerland, South Africa, Austria and the Netherlands show an exception. 
The high volatility in Scandinavian countries where labour is 
strong/corporatist certainly does not fit in well with the model. It may be 
that the fluctuations exhibited by thèse countries is a manifestation of some 
influences other than political, économie and industrial relations ones. 
The almost complète dominance of the bottom of the table by the 
U.S.A. conforms closely with the hypothèses advanced as the country is 
characterized by the polarisation of power in labour-management bargain-
ing as evidenced in the persistent failure of the unionization rate to rise 
much above 20 per cent and the extent of its industrial development would 
lead us to expect the minimization of risk (réduction of 'accidents'). 
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The behaviour of U.K. indicators affords interesting matter for 
spéculation as the nation is characterized by one of the rare cases of a union 
rate around 50 per cent, high and variable inflation, on off incomes 
policies, a polity in which labour has a considérable influence but is, itself, 
subject to disunity, and a fragmented bargaining System which would tend 
to militate against the minimization of risk. Thèse features would lead us to 
expect that, although the U.K. might be low in the table relative to non-
industrialized nations, it would be high amongst the low volatility nations. 
On the indicators for strikes and workers involved it is moderately high 
(fifth bottom, in each) but on the measure for days lost (the most popular 
choice as a mean damage estimate) it rises to thirteenth bottom making it 
one of the most distinctively volatile of the low volatility nations. 
It would be possible to pick off each country one at a time and explain 
its rankings in terms of the synthetic model outlined above, however it it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to enter into an elaborate essay on com-
parative politics and institutions; the reader may readily entertain his or her 
self with contemplation of the synthetic interprétation of the various rank-
ings. 
CONCLUSION 
Our purpose in this study was to produce an international comparison 
of the severity of industrial conflict. The weaknesses of previous com-
parative attempts were illustrated. The présent paper developed a synthetic 
model of the strike process which suggests the use of volatility as the 
measure of severity rather than levels or régression intercepts. Using régres-
sion intercepts is a good idea but difficult to develop because of the difficul-
ty of coming up with suitable data sets for a large sample of nations. The 
approach of the présent study used a large data set (62 nations) and 
minimized the problems inhérent in the data by using variation which can be 
reasonably assumed to be independent of errors introduced by différences 
in scope and définition of the séries across nations. 
The synthetic model predicted that, in gênerai, advanced industrial na-
tions would appear at the bottom of the table of strike volatility. As regards 
policy this suggests that angst in developed nations is perhaps misguided as 
far as the conséquences of industrial conflict go since industrialised nations 
appear to be efficient in minimizing risk from industrial conflict. This point 
should not be taken up too enthusiastically as it appears to be less true of 
days lost and workers involved volatilities than it is of disputes volatility. 
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It would be difficult to draw any direct conclusions for industrial rela-
tions reform; the most we can do is suggest that attention be directed 
towards the problem of fluctuating durations of strikes rather than the ex-
istence of strikes per se. Taking the case of the U.K., comparatively it can 
be seen that duration is the problem as working days lost is composed of 
disputes, number of workers and length of strikes. On the first two, the 
U.K. is only a moderately high low volatility nation, on the days lost c.v. it 
is an extremely high one. It is not clear how severeiy duration risk will im-
pair national welfare; strikes which are longer than expected hâve obvious 
welfare loss (lost output, lost income, disappointed expectations, lost good-
will etc.), strikes which are shorter than expected may also involve losses 
(excessive accumulation of stocks, maldistribution of income amongst sav-
ing and spending) but it is not clear if thèse could be serious. 
Finally it is worth noting that volatility due to duration may be symp-
tomatic of an unstable social order — longer strikes will be needed in order 
to establish increased power for labour, in the absence of this power the 
strikes will be 'defeats', thèse will reduce the ability to sustain a long strike 
for a while, while continued dissatisfaction with the lack of power will lead 
to the revival of the long strike and so on. If employers can not cope with 
('insure against') this instability then we would expect they will concède 
some of the demands so a new order will corne into being in which volatility 
is low. 
Comparaison internationale des variations de 
comportement en matière de grèves 
Cet article traite du problème de l'appréciation relative de la gravité des conflits 
de travail entre les différents pays. L'amplitude, la définition et le volume des statis-
tiques en matière de grèves diffèrent tellement d'un pays à l'autre qu'il est impossible 
d'établir des comparaisons valables entre le nombre de grèves, les travailleurs 
qu'elles impliquent et les jours de travail perdus par millier de salariés. 
On y souligne que beaucoup de commentateurs ont effectué des comparaisons 
pour évaluer si, dans un pays en particulier, le Royaume-Uni, il y a «tendance mar-
quée à la grève». Pour remplacer cette méthode peu valable, on a eu recours dans la 
présente étude à des modèles qui permettent d'éliminer les éléments découlant de 
facteurs économiques, politiques et institutionnels. 
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Les études antérieures sur ce sujet englobaient une quinzaine de pays dont le 
choix dépendait de la volonté des analystes. La présente analyse utilise les statistiques 
publiées dans soixante-deux pays pendant une période de dix ans. Le modèle repose 
sur la façon dont les chercheurs en science économique, en relations professionnelles 
ou en science politique conçoivent le problème. Ce modèle permet d'en arriver à cer-
taines prévisions au sujet du degré de variabilité parmi les indicateurs de grève, celui-
ci consistant dans le taux de fluctuation dans un indicateur de grève, c'est-à-dire que 
plus l'indicateur est dispersé, plus le comportement en matière de grève varie. 
On fonde le taux de variabilité à la fois sur le nombre de jours de travail perdus, 
sur le nombre de travailleurs(euses) touchés(ées) par les grèves et sur le nombre de 
conflits. Le modèle indique que la variabilité du nombre de grèves sera plus grande 
que la variabilité des jours de travail perdus ou celle des travailleurs(euses) 
touchés(ées) par la grève. 
Ce modèle révèle aussi que la variabilité de l'ensemble des mesures est moindre 
dans les pays développés que dans les nations moins développées. Parmi les pays 
développés, on peut estimer que la variabilité est plus marquée si l'inflation est forte, 
si le cadre des négociations n'est pas flexible, si les politiques de revenus ont par mo-
ment joué un rôle, si les employeurs et les travailleurs(euses) ne sont pas bien inté-
grés(ées) dans une situation cohérente. 
Les prévisions du modèle ont été vérifiées par le calcul du coefficient de variabi-
lité à partir des statistiques pour la période 1968-1977. D'une façon générale, les 
résultats confirment les prévisions du modèle. On y trouve que la variabilité est plus 
grande pour le nombre de grèves que pour le nombre de jours perdus et des travail-
leurs(euses) touchés(ées). La variabilité est en général plus grande pour tous les indi-
cateurs parmi les pays développés que parmi les pays moins développés. On peut 
soutenir que, parmi les nations développées, le Royaume-Uni présente un fort degré 
de variabilité dans la manière de se comporter en matière de grèves, ce qui confirme 
le modèle que les systèmes politiques et de relations professionnelles sont tels qu'ils 
entraînent un haut degré de variabilité. La situation dans les pays Scandinaves 
présente un haut degré de variabilité qui semble contredire le modèle. On peut penser 
que ceci est attribuable à des facteurs dont on n'a pas tenu compte dans le modèle. 
L'interprétation de la situation relative des pays développés reste ouverte pour des 
recherches futures. 
TABLE I 
Variabililv of Strike Behaviour 
Rank 
liiis/uiicsi i Country 
1 Panama 
2 Spain 
3 Egypt 
4 Guadelope 
5 Solomon Islands 
6 Indonesia 
7 Thailand 
8 Guatemala 
9 Mauritius 
10 Netherlands 
11 Tunisia 
12 Nigeria 
13 Switzerland 
14 New Caledonia 
15 Iceland 
16 Cameroon 
17 Bermuda 
18 Finland 
19 Denmark 
20 South Africa 
21 Korea 
22 Surinam 
23 Trinidad 
24 Sarawak 
25 Norway 
26 Maroc 
27 Fiji 
28 Martinique 
29 Sweden 
30 Singapore 
31 Sri Lanka 
32 Venezuala 
Rank C.V. Rank C.V. 
C.V. (workers (workers (days (days 
(disputes) involved) involved) lost) lost) 
239.8 6 142.1 
199.2 48 49.3 44 56.2 
171.3 14 112.3 
156.8 5 142.7 9 149.7 
151 30 71.4 21 117 
130.9 4 151.6 2 250.1 
129.1 9 130.7 15 130.4 
114.7 19 104.1 20 118.3 
113.8 12 123.9 19 119 
112.5 24 87.53 13 134.6 
99.2 2 158.4 
96.6 18 104.2 28 91.4 
90.2 15 109.9 18 120.4 
86.1 29 74.4 
84.6 
84.4 36 61 
83.1 20 100.6 1 315.9 
78.4 17 120.7 
78 8 131.9 3 245.1 
77.5 11 125.2 8 157 
77 23 87.6 22 108.7 
73.8 37 60.3 38 68.6 
63.5 21 93.1 14 133.4 
63.4 10 129.3 22 108.7 
63.1 7 140.6 7 161.7 
63 34 61.4 34 72.2 
62.6 3 156.6 11 142.3 
61.1 42 57.1 12 137.8 
60.6 17 105 9 10 147.7 
59.3 39 58.3 
58.4 25 85.2 32 86.3 
55.7 
(disputes) Country 
33 Sabah 
34 Zambia 
35 Sierra Leone 
36 Burundi 
37 Ghana 
38 Jamaica 
39 Pakistan 
40 Malawi 
41 Malta 
42 Hong Kong 
43 Japan 
44 Peninsular Malaysia 
45 Peru 
46 Santa Lucia 
47 New Zealand 
48 Belgium 
49 Puerto Rico 
50 Kenya 
51 Canada 
52 Turkey 
53 Israël 
54 Ireland 
55 India 
56 U.K. 
57 France 
58 Italy 
59 Australia 
60 U.S.A. 
Austria 
60 Total 
Rank C.V. Rank C.V. 
C.V. (workers (workers (days (days 
disputes ) involved) in volved) lost) lost) 
52.6 35 61.3 40 68.1 
51.2 45 51.8 26 97.8 
50.8 22 89.2 
50.2 27 82.7 29 90.6 
49.3 41 57.9 37 70.1 
47.9 53 37.8 30 89.2 
43.7 39 58.3 31 87.9 
43.7 28 76.3 27 93.7 
42.9 32 67.4 25 100.2 
42.2 31 71 35 70.6 
40.2 52 40.1 49 43.9 
39.9 33 67.3 24 100.5 
39.8 38 60 33 77.4 
39.4 16 122.6 
37.5 43 54 46 52 
36.3 51 41.2 45 55.7 
34.6 57 32.5 47 45.3 
33.6 12 123.9 38 68.9 
33.5 26 83.3 50 41.7 
31 50 42.4 48 45 
26.5 45 51.8 43 59.5 
21.6 55 33.1 41 66.2 
21.5 49 48.3 52 34.6 
20.4 54 33.6 42 60.3 
19.2 56 32.9 54 28.5 
18.9 44 52.3 51 39.5 
15.3 47 50.4 35 71.5 
6.8 58 21.8 53 29 
16 !06 6 5 184.2 
1 161.5 6 174.1 
TABLE 2 
Means of Data Sets 
H'orkers 
Countrv Disputes Involved Davs Lost 
U.K. 2,692.1 1,443,260 10,136,200 
Japan 2,697.4 1,964,510 5,233,440 
U.S.A. 5,431.9 2,492,410 41,397,400 
Australia 2,368.2 1,095,100 2,473,520 
Italy 4,279.2 6,556,800 21,540,300 
France 3,509 2,006,480 3,549,890 
India 2,665 1,635,770 21,060,400 
Ireland 151.2 37,474 485,537 
Israël 124.7 94,999 229,357 
Turkey 85.1 13,579 474,200 
Canada 784 49,625 7,081,880 
Kenya 85.9 20,122 51,742 
Puerto Rico 70.7 16,201 226,776 
Belgium 183.6 69,155 717,485 
N. Zealand 347.5 95,976 243,203 
Santa Lucia 4.5 550 
Peru 467.8 249,812 1,162,483 
Peninsular Malaysia 60.5 13,182 78,557 
Hong Kong 33.1 7,749 26,462 
Malta 32.7 11,419 44,816 
Malawi 10.4 1,333 1,578 
Pakistan 242.6 160,504 1,008,880 
Bermuda 4.4 857 8,452,450 
Cameroon 10.3 4,863 
New Caledonia 10.9 2,935 20,741 
Switzerland 6.4 846 7,097 
Iceland 62.9 
Panama 37.9 34,748 
Spain 3,394.1 321.476 998,002 
Egypt 103 11,092 
Guadelope 9.4 2,789 30,245 
H'orkers 
Countrv Disputes Involved Davs lost 
Solomon Islands 13 570 2,318 
Indonesia 8 2,404 6,329 
Thailand 135.2 47,071 209,890 
Guatemala 14.8 13.206 152,578 
Mauritius 19 18,946 49,408 
Netherlands 24 23,690 137,043 
Tunisia 124.9 19,472 
Nigeria 116.4 59,730 149,718 
Sarawak 2.4 223 341 
Norway 14.1 6,024 60,885 
Maroc 261.9 50.051 334,185 
Fiji 39.9 12,525 37,795 
Martinique 6.3 4,409 62,393 
Sweden 63.1 18,936 194,215 
Singapore 5.3 1,503 
Sri Lanka 196.8 84.369 536,660 
Venezuala 129 
Sabah 5.1 388 876 
Zambia 101 13,969 36,770 
Sierra Leone 5.9 1,715 
Burundi 9.2 3,123 9,174 
Ghana 42.9 26,274 901,719 
Jamaica 107.9 17,890 233,398 
Austria 15,872 30,438 
W. Germany 169,549 825,055 
Trinidad 49.5 18,335 168,985 
Surinam 19.4 3,269 26,597 
Korea 31.7 12,215 32,064 
South Africa 171.8 24,864 490,081 
Denmark 86 84,097 552,462 
Finland 811 884,583 
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APPENDIX 
to Tables 1 & 2 
Ail data are taken from the I.L.O. Yearbook of Labor Statistics (Geneva, 1978) 
The second and third columns of Table 2 are rounded to whole numbers. 
The following variations exist in the data. 
Excludes Political Strikes; New Zealand, UK, India, Pakistan, Denmark, Italy (1969-74) 
Excludes workers indirectly affected 
Finland (pre-1971), Puerto Rico, Japan, Fiji, Canada, Nigeria, Italy, Belgium, Norway 
Exclusions based on severity of dispute 
Norway (less than one day), Denmark (less than 100 working days lost), Jamaica (less than 10 
workers, 100 wkg. days), Japan (less than 4 hours), Israël (less than 10 working days lost), 
Australia (less than 10 days lost), Canada (less than 10 man days), India (less than 10 workers), 
Pakistan (less than 10 workers), Finland (less than 4 hours except where more than 100 work-
ing days lost), UK (less than 10 workers, less than 1 day only, except where more than 100 
working days lost); USA (excludes less than 6 workers or full-day or shift) 
Not based on calendar year Nigeria (yr, end March), Puerto Rico (Yr. end June) 
Other 
Peru (days lost computed on basis of 8-hr. working days), France (excludes agriculture and 
public administration), Jamaica (pre-1973 excludes disputes where data for workers involved & 
days lost is not available), Pakistan (geographical scope extended 1971, 1973 excludes Sind 
province) 
Note: we hâve not listed ail coverage variations due to the argument of the text. 
LA RÉDUCTION 
DE LA DURÉ DU TRAVAIL 
Introduction: René BOULARD, Jean-Paul DESCHÊCHES, Alain LAROCQUE,Clau-
de RONDEAU - La réduction du temps de travail: un droit ou un privilège? Alain 
LAROCQUE - La signification du travail en 1980: émergence de valeurs nouvelles? 
Jean-Paul MONTMIMY - Commentaires: Ghislain DUFOUR, Norbert RODRIGUE 
-Le temps libéré: à quels coûts? Kimon VALASKAKIS - Commentaires: Lise POULIN-
SIMON, Bernard FORTIN - Table ronde: Sommes-nous tous égaux face à la diminu-
tion du temps passé au travail? Gilles FERLAND, Jean-Marie HAMELIN, Pierre-Paul 
PROULX - Le temps passé au travail: un élément encore négociable? Gilles MASSE 
-Commentaire: Jean-Paul DESCHÊNES - La législation: consolidation ou innovation? 
Gilles BEAUSOLEIL, Hervé GAUTHIER - Commentaires: Luc M. LOCKWELL et 
Pierre LORTIE - La technologie: un substitut à la durée du travail? Monique FRAP-
PIER-DESROCHERS - Table ronde: La réduction du temps passé au travail: un moyen 
de lutte contre le chômage? Fernand D'AOUST, André DEOM, Pierre HARVEY - La 
diminution du temps de travail: un phénomène inéluctable? Michel CROZIER. 
ISBN 2-7636-6973-X 1 volume, 273 pages - Prix: $17.00 
Les Presses de l'Université Laval 
Cité universitaire C.P. 2447, Québec, P.Q., Canada, G1K 7R4 
